MULTI-CLOUD AUTHORITY · PROOF OF VALUE

Authentication succeeded. Authority did not.

One frozen VAGP v0.2 authority protocol was live proven through Google Agent Identity and Microsoft Entra Agent Identity without treating provider IAM/RBAC as organisational authority.

Proof of Value · local previewVAGP v0.2 · Independently reviewed

DEMO BOUNDARY

This page is a marketing explainer. The separate CloudOps application is local, deterministic and not exposed as a public security endpoint. The cloud PoVs are bounded live evidence, not a public demo surface.

CROSS-PLATFORM EVIDENCE

VAGP v0.2ONE FROZEN AUTHORITY PROTOCOL

One frozen authority protocol. Two real cloud identity ecosystems. Same organisational authority model.

LIVE PROOF

GOOGLE CLOUD

Google Agent Identity
Verimand Authority Gateway
VAGP v0.2
real protected Google Cloud execution

LIVE PROOF

MICROSOFT AZURE

Entra Agent Identity
Verimand Authority Gateway
VAGP v0.2
real protected Azure execution

DEMONSTRATED

Google Cloud

Google Agent Identity

Secret-version state

VAGP v0.2 live PoV complete

Development executed. Production blocked by NO_AUTHORITY. Post-DERIVE revocation rejected. Experimental, not a production service.

Evidence boundary

docs/pov/verimand-multicloud-authority-pov-v0.2.md · 2026-09-08

DEMONSTRATED

Microsoft Azure

Entra Agent Identity

Azure VM operation

VAGP v0.2 live PoV complete

Development VM deallocated. Production blocked by NO_AUTHORITY. Post-DERIVE revocation rejected. Experimental, not a production service.

Evidence boundary

docs/pov/verimand-multicloud-authority-pov-v0.2.md · 2026-09-08

IdentityWho is the agent?

AuthorityWhy may it act?

ExecutionCan the protected resource execute?

WitnessWhat evidence explains the outcome?

Evidence snapshot · 8 September 2026. Identity layer differs per cloud. Verimand complements IAM/RBAC; it does not replace them. No production readiness claim.

Authorised DEV

AUTHORITY_CONFIRMED → BIND → DERIVE → VERIFY. Real cloud resource changed state.

PROD NO_AUTHORITY

Authentication succeeded. Gateway technically capable. Authority did not. No execution.

Post-DERIVE revocation

Grant derived. Exact Mandate revoked before VERIFY. VERIFY rejected. No execution.

One frozen protocol. Two cloud identity ecosystems.

Google used Google Agent Identity and protected Secret Manager execution. Azure used Entra Agent Identity and protected ARM VM execution. In both cases, the Verimand Authority Gateway ran the same VAGP v0.2 RESOLVE → BIND → DERIVE → VERIFY authority model.

A: authorised development action reached VERIFIED and changed real cloud state. B: production-labelled action authenticated and the gateway was technically capable, but VAGP returned NO_AUTHORITY and no execution occurred. C: after DERIVE, exact Mandate revocation caused VERIFY to reject and no provider call executed.

This is an experimental PoV, not a public live demo or production service. The VM examples below are educational simulations; the consolidated evidence package records which live cloud states were actually observed.

SANITIZED SIX-CASE MATRIX

Actual cloud outcomes, without raw cloud identifiers.

The public evidence package distinguishes provider invocation, VERIFY outcome and observed resource state. Raw traces, tenant identifiers, principal identifiers, credentials, secret values and internal witness payloads stay out of the public artifact.

CloudCaseAction / resourceAuthorityVERIFYProvider / stateLimit

Google CloudA: Authorized development executioncloud.secret.version.disable
secret:development:01AUTHORITY_CONFIRMED -> BOUND -> GRANT_DERIVEDVERIFIEDSecret Manager version-state operation invoked.
Development dummy version disabled; production dummy version remained enabled.Bounded live PoV. Secret values, raw traces and provider identifiers are withheld.

Google CloudB: Authenticated production request blockedcloud.secret.version.disable
secret:production:01NO_AUTHORITYNOT_REACHEDNot invoked.
Development and production dummy versions remained enabled.Shows organizational authority gating, not an IAM replacement claim.

Google CloudC: Post-DERIVE revocation blockedcloud.secret.version.disable
secret:development:01AUTHORITY_CONFIRMED -> BOUND -> GRANT_DERIVEDREJECTEDNot invoked.
Development dummy version remained enabled after revocation.Revocation is checked at VERIFY inside the single-instance process-local scope.

Microsoft AzureA: Authorized development executioncloud.vm.stop
vm:development:01AUTHORITY_CONFIRMED -> BOUND -> EXECUTION_GRANT_DERIVEDVERIFIEDARM VM operation invoked.
Development VM deallocated.Bounded live PoV. Raw object IDs, traces and tenant details are withheld.

Microsoft AzureB: Authenticated production request blockedcloud.vm.stop
vm:production:01NO_AUTHORITYNOT_REACHEDNot invoked.
Production VM remained running during the scenario.Shows authority denial before ARM mutation, not production readiness.

Microsoft AzureC: Post-DERIVE revocation blockedcloud.vm.stop
vm:development:01AUTHORITY_CONFIRMED -> BOUND -> EXECUTION_GRANT_DERIVEDREJECTEDNot invoked.
Development VM remained running during the scenario.Witness evidence explains revocation; it never authorizes execution.

Download the sanitized evidence appendix Read the versioned VAGP v0.2 reference Learn how authority relates to identity and authorization Talk to Verimand about an authority pilot

THE EXACT REQUEST

Stop one development VM.

The request is deliberately concrete. Subject, action and resource must remain exact through RESOLVE, BIND, DERIVE and VERIFY.

SUBJECTagent:cloudops-17
ACTIONcloud.instance.stop
RESOURCEcloud://eu-west/dev/vm-204
CONTEXTauthoritative resource inventory

INTERACTIVE EXPLAINER

INTERACTIVE EXPLAINERPoV · LOCAL PREVIEW

cloud://eu-west/dev/vm-204

RESOLVEAUTHORITY_CONFIRMED

VERIFYVERIFIED

APPLICATIONEXECUTED

Exact subject, action and resource remain bound end to end.

WHAT THE POV PROVES

01Positive continuity

An exact development request reaches VERIFIED and the application records EXECUTED.

02Scope mismatch

Development authority cannot authorise a production resource; the application remains BLOCKED.

03Post-DERIVE revocation

Current-path validation at VERIFY rejects a now-revoked witness before consequence.

04Replay resistance

Process-local verifier state prevents the same semantic Grant from producing another verified execution inside the stated single-instance scope.

WHAT IT DOES NOT CLAIM

Semantic proof, not production portability.

The current Execution Grant is unsigned and process-local. The PoV does not claim cryptographic portability, durable replay protection, distributed state or an enterprise control plane.

Portable signed grants, cryptographic receipts, persistent state and production-grade cloud integrations remain planned. The live Google and Azure PoVs do not establish those capabilities.

Production deployment capabilities · Planned